We use newly available representative panel data for manufacturing enterprises in West and East Germany to investigate the link between production-related subsidies and exports. We report that only a small fraction of enterprises is subsidized, and that exports and subsidies are positively related. Using a matching approach to investigate the causal effect of subsidies on export activities we find no impact of subsidies on the probability to start exporting, and only weak evidence for an impact of subsidies on the share of exports in total sales in West Germany but no evidence in East Germany.
1.

Motivation
Most governments -in developing as well as in developed countries -maintain explicit export promotion policies ranging from lower tax rates for export earnings to direct subsidization of exporting activities. This is not surprising since exporting success is seen by many policy makers and the public alike as a key indicator of a nation's economic performance. What needs to be kept in mind, though, is that in general explicit export subsidization is illegal under WTO rules. Furthermore, whether or not such export promotion policies are successful in stimulating exports is still debated. For example, Bernard and Jensen (2004) find that state level export promotion expenditures in the US do not have a significant effect on exporting at the firm level. By contrast, Volpe Martincus and Carballo (2009) and Helmers and Trofimenko (2009) find some positive effects of export subsidies using firm level data for Peru and Colombia, respectively.
Recent theory and evidence in heterogeneous firm type models find that only firms that are productive enough select to become exporters, due to sunk costs of exporting. This suggests an alternative strategy for governments interested in fostering exports, namely, help firms to improve production-related aspects to assist them to overcome these barriers to exporting. In this regard, a number of papers have investigated whether production-related subsidies have an impact on firms' export performance. Görg et al. (2008) report that while such production subsidies in the Republic of Ireland do not encourage firms to start exporting, they encourage previous exporters to export more. Girma et al. (2007) investigate the exporting effects of production subsidies in China and find positive effects that are more pronounced among firms that are in capital intensive industries and are already export active. This paper contributes to this literature by presenting first evidence on the link between subsidies aimed at production-related aspects of firm activities, and exports for Germany, a leading actor on the world market for goods and services. Using newly available representative panel data for manufacturing enterprises in West and East Germany we report that only a small fraction of enterprises is subsidized, and that exports and subsidies are positively related. Applying a matching approach to investigate the causal effect of subsidies on export activities we find no impact of subsidies on the probability to start exporting, and only weak evidence for an impact of subsidies on the growth of the share of exports in total sales in West Germany but no evidence in East Germany.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the enterprise-level data used in the empirical investigation. Section 3 reports descriptive evidence on subsidies in German manufacturing and their links to exports. Section 4 presents results from our econometric investigations of the causal effects of subsidies on exporting. Section 5 concludes.
Data
The data used in this study are merged from two surveys conducted by the German Statistical Offices. One source is a monthly report for establishments in manufacturing industries that covers all local production units that have at least 20 employees itself or that belong to an enterprise with a total of at least 20 employees.
Information from the monthly surveys is either summed up for a year, or average values for a year are computed, and a panel data set is build from annual data.
Furthermore, the information collected at the establishment level has been aggregated at the enterprise level. A detailed description of the information in these data is given in Konold (2007) . For this study we use the information on exports 1 and total sales of the enterprise to identify enterprises that are exporters in a year, and to compute the share of exports in total sales.
The second source of data used here is the cost structure survey for enterprises in the manufacturing sector. This survey is carried out annually as a representative stratified random sample survey. Stratification is based on 4-digit industries and five size classes (20 -49 employees, 50 -99 employees, 100 -249 employees, 250 -499 employees, and 500 and more employees). The sample size is around 18,000 enterprises. According to the Federal Statistical Office the data from the cost structure survey are of high quality, and representative for enterprises with at least 20 employees (see Statistisches Bundesamt (2007)). While all enterprises with 500 or more employees are included in each survey, a stratified random sample of smaller firms with 20 to 499 employees is drawn that remains in the survey sample for four years in succession and that is replaced by a new stratified random sample afterwards. Therefore, data from the cost structure survey can be used to build an unbalanced panel containing all enterprises with at least 500 employees (in a year) plus a sample of smaller firms with a rotating panel design. A detailed description of the cost structure survey can be found in Fritsch et al. (2004) .
In the cost structure survey the enterprise has to report the amount of subsidies received in a year. Subsidies are defined as any unrequited payments received from federal, regional or local authorities, or from the European Communities, to lower costs of production and/or to lower the prices of goods produced and/or to allow sufficient payments for factors of production. Hence, we refer to this financial assistance as production-related subsidies; they are clearly not 1 Exports are deliveries to customers outside Germany or to a German wholesale company that sells the goods to a customer in a foreign country. Indirect exports -e. g., tyres that are sold to a German manufacturer of cars who exports some of these cars -cannot be identified. [ Table 2 and table 3 near here] Subsidies and exports are positively related. Table 4 and table 5 [ Table 4 and table 5 near here]
Effects of subsidies on exports
The positive relationship between subsidies and exports reported in table 4 and table   5 cannot be interpreted in a causal way. On the one hand, subsidies may cause a firm to start to export, or to increase its share of exports in total sales, by helping to cover fixed costs associated with starting to export (e. g., the adaptation of the products to regulations in a foreign country) or by lowering variable costs of production or exporting. On the other hand, exporting may cause a firm to be subsidized when subsidies are aimed at exporting firms due to special government 5 The models for the share of exports in total sales are estimated by fractional logit to take care of the fact that the share of exports in total sales is a percentage variable with a probability mass at zero due to a large share of firms with no exports; see Papke and Wooldridge (1996) and Wagner (2001).
programmes. The influence may run in one or both directions, and there might be other enterprise characteristics besides exports and subsidies that have an influence on both -research and development activities for example may both foster exports due to more innovative products and subsidies due to targeted government intervention. Simple regression analyses of the type performed in the previous section cannot reveal causal relationships.
If subsidies are not given to enterprises at random (and we have no reason to assume they are) the causal effect of subsidies on starting to export, or on the share of exports in total sales, cannot be calculated from comparing subsidized and nonsubsidized firms. If subsidized firms have a higher probability to export (as reported in the last section) we cannot say whether this is caused by the subsidies or not, because we cannot observe whether a subsidized firm would have started to export without subsidies if it did receive subsidies. We simply do not have any information about the counterfactual situation. So how can we be sure that the higher probability to export of subsidized firms compared to non-subsidized firms is caused by subsidies (or not)?
This closely resembles a situation familiar from the evaluation of active labour market programmes (or any other form of treatment of units): If participants, or treated units, are not selected randomly from a population but are selected (or selfselect) according to certain criteria, the effect of a treatment cannot be evaluated by comparing the average performance of the treated and the non-treated. However,
given that each unit (enterprise, or person, etc.) either participated or not, we have no information about its performance in the counterfactual situation. A way out is to construct a control group in such a way that every treated unit is matched to an untreated unit that has been as similar as possible (ideally, identical) at the time before the treatment. Differences between the two groups (the treated, and the matched non-treated) after the treatment can then be attributed to the treatment (for a comprehensive discussion, see Heckman, LaLonde and Smith (1999) ).
To investigate the causal effects of subsidies on the probability to export the matching approach is used as follows. We consider receiving subsidies Alternatively, subsidies could be considered not as a binary treatment (an enterprise is subsidized or not in a year) but as a continuous treatment that varies between zero Euro per employee and some maximum amount. We experimented with this continuous treatment approach, but it turned out to be not computationally feasible due to the extremely skew distribution of subsidies per employee and the large share of non-subsidized firms (see section 3). For the method to investigate a continuous treatment see Imbens (2000) and Hirano and Imbens (2004) ; an application to the analysis of exports is Fryges and Wagner (2008) .
2000. The variables used to compute the propensity score are from the pre-treatment year 2000.
The balancing property (that requires an absence of statistically significant differences between the treatment group and the control group in the covariates after matching) is tested by checking whether the difference in means of the variables used to compute the propensity score is never statistically significant between firms that started to become subsidized and the matched non-starters. The common support condition (that requires that the propensity score of a treated observation is neither higher than the maximum nor less than the minimum propensity score of the controls) is imposed by dropping subsidy starters (treated observations) whose propensity score is higher than the maximum or lower than the minimum propensity score of the non-subsidized firms (the controls). Matching is done using Stata 10.1 and the psmatch2 command (version 3.0.0), see Leuven and Sianesi (2003) .
The difference in the share of export starters (the outcome variable) between the subsidy starters (the treated enterprises) and the matched non-subsidized enterprises (the non-treated firms) is the so-called average treatment effect on the treated, or ATT, the estimated effect of subsidies on the probability to export.
Results are reported in table 6 for West Germany and in table 7 for East
Germany. Matching was successful in all cases (taking care of the common support condition explained above); there are no statistically significant differences in the mean values of the variables used for matching in the pre-treatment year. Note that the probit regressions that are used to compute the propensity score include a complete set of 4-digit industry dummy variables, so that all observations from an industry that has observations from either the control group or the treatment group only are dropped.
[ Table 6 and table 7 Furthermore, the ATT is never statistically different from zero. 7 Therefore, from the empirical investigation performed here we have no evidence that subsidies cause enterprises to start to export.
In a second step the causal effect of subsidies on the growth in the share of exports in total sales is investigated. Here the matching approach is used as follows. [ Table 8 and table 9 near here]
The difference in the change in the share of exports in total sales (the outcome variable) between the subsidy starters (the treated enterprises) and the matched nonsubsidized enterprises (the non-treated firms) is positive in both periods in West Germany, and it is both large (four percentage points) and statistically significant at a usual level for the second period considered here. Again, the number of firms in the groups of treated and non-treated enterprises is small. However, we have at least some weak evidence for a positive causal effect of subsidies on the share of exports in total sales in West German manufacturing enterprises. This is in contrast to the results for East Germany, where the computed ATT is negative in one period and never statistically different from zero.
Conclusions
This paper uses newly available representative panel data for manufacturing enterprises to investigate the link between subsidies and exports in Germany for the first time. While exports and subsidies are positively related, a matching approach applied to uncover any causal effect of subsidies on export activities finds no impact of subsidies on the probability to start exporting. Furthermore, we find some evidence for a positive impact of subsidies on the share of exports in total sales in West Germany but not in East Germany.
Our finding of a lack of a robust relationship between subsidies and exporting is consistent with results reported in the context of other western economies using either export (Bernard and Jensen (2004) ) or production-related assistance (Görg et al. (2008) ). The latter paper, using data for Ireland, also finds no evidence that production subsidies encourage firms to start exporting but that they have a positive effect on export quantities for those firms that already export. This perhaps suggests that this kind of financial assistance is less useful in allowing firms to prepare themselves for overcoming the initial barriers to exporting. Rather, it seems likely that firms use these grants to improve their production processes, increase the quality and/or lower the price of their products to remain competitive in export markets. What exactly the mechanisms are by which subsidies allow firms to improve their competitiveness, remains an important issue for further research. 
